Abstracts of Recent American Decisions by Editors,
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
but the public against fraud and altcrations, by refusing to sign
negotiable paper, made in such form as to admit of fraudulent
practices upon them, with case and without ready detection." By
executing a note in such form, that a material part may be de-
tached and a perfect instrument left, the maker places it in the
power of the payee to perpetrate fraud with ease and facility, and
without risk of detection. By intrusting such paper to the payee,
the maker as~erts his confidence that the payee will practise no
fraud ; and if that confidence is misplaced, the maker, rather than
an innocent holder, must suffer. Confidence under such circum-
stances is certainly a species of negligence: Putnam v. Sullivan,
3 Mass. 45. The maker places it in the power of the payee to do
the wrong; his act facilitates and invites the fraud, and he ought
to suffer any loss resulting therefrom. It follows from the forego-
ing views that the facts stated in the reply are sufficient to avoid
the answer, and the demurrer is therefore overruled,
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA.'
SUPREM1E COURT OF MICIIGAN.2
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE.!
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY. 4
SUPRE3E COURT OF WISCONSIN. 5
A GENT.
Admi.sibilt, of Statements bL.-Statements made by a general agent,
in order to be evidence against his principal, must have been made in
the course of the business intrusted to him : Ashimore v. Pennsylvania
Steam Towicg Co., 9 Vrooni.
This rule excludes all statements or narrations of such agent which,
although relating to the business of the principal, were not made in exe-
cution of the agency: Id.
I From Hon. Thos. G. Jones, Reporter ; cases decided at January Term 1875
the volume in which they will be reported cannot yet be indicated.
2 From Hoyt 'ost, Esq., Reporter ; cases decided at February and April
Terms 1875.
3 From John 31. Shirley, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 54 & 55 N. IL Reports.
4 From G. 1). W. Vroom, Esq., Reporter; to appear in vol. 9 of his Reports.
5 From Hon. 0. M. Conover, Reorter; to appear in 36 Wisconsin Reports.
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BILLS AND NOTES. See Pleading.
Paynizent of Interest by Partner after Dissoltion-Married Woman.
-Payment of interest on a note drawn by a firm, by one of the mem-
bers after the dissolution of the firm, but within six years after the ma-
turity of such note, will renew it as against the Statute of Limitations:
Merritt et al. v. Dayi, et al., 9 Vroom.
Nor will the fact that one of the firm is a married woman alter the
effect of such reneWal : Id.
BREACH OF PROMISE.
.Evidence.-In an action for breach of promise evidence was offered to
show the statements of the plaintiff to third persons, made within a few
days after the defendant's final refusal to marry her, that she cared
nothing about him ; that all she wanted was his monoy; that she only
proposed to marry him to spite his family; that she had refused to live
in any residence he had or place where he was living, and the like.
This evidence was rejected on the ground that they were made after
the engagement had been broken. Held, That the evidence proposed
Would have tended to show feelings on the part of the plaintiff while
the engagement was in force, inconsistent with any purpose to fulfil the
engagement in a spirit befitting the relation contemplated by it, and
such as must have rendered a breach of the contract by defendant of
little or no injury to her; and that such feelings and purposes as were
proposed to be shown may be shown as well by admissions made after a
breach of the engagement as before : Miller v. Rosier, S. C. Mich.
It is also alleged for error that the plaintiff was allowed to show the
value of the farm belonging to the detendant's father. The only ground
on which it is claimed this was admissible was that from other evidence
it had been shown defendant had stated to plaintiff that his property was
invested in this farm. How much was invested he did not state, nor
was it shown. Held, That the court below correctly ruled that evidence
of defendant's pecuniary circumstances might be put in by-tle plaintiff;
but that this" evidence only went to show the father's circumstances,
which were wholly immaterial: Id.
The circuit judge, at the request of the plaintiff, instructed the jury
that if they found for plaintiff they should award her such damages as
would place her in as good a condition, pecuniarily, as she would have
been if the contract had been fulfilled. Held, That this ruling is one
the elements of which are altogether too complicated and conjectural,
and that it should not have been given : Id.
CANAL COMPANY.
Ultra Vires.-It is not ultra vsires for a canal company, having the
right to draw water from a public river for its chartered purpose, to
agree to discharge its waste water at a certain point: Armstrong v.
Pennsglania Railroad Co., 9 Vroom.
Quere. Whether such agreement can stipulate for a continuance of
such supply, notwithstanding that, in the fiiir judgment of the officers of
the company, its convenience or real interest requires the cessation of
such privilege: Id.
CHANCERY. See Election.
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CIIATTEL MORTGAGE. See Infant; 31ortgage.
CONTEMPT.
Evidcnce.-In general, proceedings for a contempt of court, not coin-
mitted in the presence of the court, ought to be substantially according
to the course of practice in criminal trials; and so, where evidence is
introduced in such case beyond the answers ot' the respondent, it ought
generally to be such as would be admissible on the trial of an indictment
for the same offence : Bates's Case, 55 N. I1.
CONTRACT. See Vendor.
CORPORATION. See (anal Com!any.
E.toppel of Parties dedling wiith--egality of Proceeings.-One who
gives a note to a corporation will not be perlnitted to deny that there is
such a corporation : .,ashiua Fire Is. Co. v. Moore, 55 N. II.
In .'n action brougdht by a corporation, the defendant, by pleading the
general issue, adiits that the plaintiffs are a corporation capable of sus-
taining an action : M.
A provision in the by-laws of a corporation, which requires the di-
rectors to be chosen at the annual neitings of the corporation, is direct-
ory only, and not restrictive. Its observance is not essential to the
exercise of' tei power of election : l.
The legality or the election of directors of a corporation cannot be
brought collaterally in question; but the proceedings must be instituted
for the express purpose of' evicting theni, if not properly elected : 1.
CtRMInAL LAW.
'ror-Donlt-Evdence.-In a criminal case, especially when there
is conflict between the witnesses for the state and defence, it is error to
charge the jury, " that although they may have a reasonable doubt of
any single fact in the testimony of any witness, they cannot acquit,
unless such fact is material to the issue joined :" Williams v. The State,
S. C. Ala.
Such a charge is calculated to mislead the jury, withdraw from their
consideration material evidence and submits to them the determination
of a question of law whether any of the fa'cts in evidence, are material
to the issue joined : Id.
Jfalti/;iiousness in Pleadig.-An indietment (founded upon Gen.
Stats.. eh. 2(4. sec. 15 1, charging that the respondents," with force and
arms in and upon one Stephen Lohiel, of said Hart's Location, feloniously
did make an assault, and him the said Stephen Lohicl in bodily fear and
danger of his lifte then and there feloniously did put, and two bank bills
lbr the payment of two dollars each, and of the value of two dollars each,
of the national currency of' the United States, and two United States
treasury notes of the value of two dollars each, of the goods, chattels, and
nioneys of' hint the said Stephen Lohiel. from the person and against
the will of him the said Stephen Lohiel then and there feloniously and
putting in fear did steal, take, and carry away. contrary to the form of
the statute," is not bad for uncertainty, duplicity, or repugnancy
State v. 4orhaam, . 55 N. I.
An uiidictenent which charges the commission of an offence which in
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its nature includes several inferior offences, is not. for such reason, mul-
tifitrious : Id.
A single count in an indictment may allege all the circumstances
necessary to constitute two different crimes, where the offence described
is a complicated one, comprehending in itself divers circumstances, each
of which is an offence : 1d.
Where goods are stolen out of the possession of a bailee, they may be
described in the indictment as the property of the bailor or of the bailee,
although the goods were never in the real owner's possession, but in
that of the hailee merely: d.
Bank bills are the subject of larceny, and no other description of them
is required than that employed in the portion of the indictment recited
in the first paragraph above : Id.
The offence of robbery is sustained by proof of a felonious taking of
property from the person of another by assault, althoughwithout putting
in fear. This is equally true with reference to our statute and to the
common law: 1 T.
DAMAGES. See Nuisance.
DEBTOR AND CREoITOR.
Application of Pagment.-A debtor, paying money to a creditor who
has several claims against him, may direct to which the payment
shall be'applied. If the debtor makes no application, the creditor may
apply it to any lawful demand due and payable: Bean v. Brown, 54
N. H.
Composition Deed-llegal Consideration for Signing.-A note given
by a debtor to induce his creditor to sign a composition deed, without
the knowledge of the other creditors who are parties to the deed, is ille-
gal and void, and it will make no difference if the note is given to a
third party, who pays the amount to such creditor, having knowledge
of all the circumstances: Winn v. Thomas, 55 N. H.
Such note being illegal and void cannot be the consideration of a new
promise : Id.
DEED.
Obligation of conditions on Grantee-Easecnnt.-The grantee of a
deed inter partes is bound by the conditions, covenants and stipulations
therein on his part, although the deed is only signed by the grantor.
If they be such as are legally sufficient to create easement in the prem-
ises granted, the grantee takes the land subject to that servitude : Earle
v. New Brinswick and Mitchell, 9 Yroom.
Executors having a general power to sell, laid out a tract of the tesLator's
lands into building lots, fronting on proposed streets, and made and filed
a map on which such streets were delineated. The deed from the exe-
cutors to the plaintiff's grantor for several of these lots, after a description
by boundaries on such streets contained also a grant of the land forming
part of Townshbend street, as marked on the map, "subject to the use
at all times of the same by the owners of lots on said ways. and by the
public generally, as and for said Townshend street, as laid down on and
according to the aforesaid map," Held, that the lands conveyed within
the lines of Townshend street were by such description dedicated to
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public use for a strect; and that the public authorities could not be sued
as trespas sers tr an entry oil the lands to open tile street : .d.
EASEMEN'T. See Deed.
ELECTION.
Ara'remen Is- Tshking under a Will.-Where a Court of Chancery
takes jurisdiction of' an administration, it applies, according to its own
practice, the laws relating to administrations, in the Probate Court, and
inay, when necessary to a distribution among heirs and distributecs,
decree an accouot ofr advancements : Key ct al. v. Jones, S. C. Ala.
Verbal declarations of a distributee, after tie death of the intestate,
that he had received a full share and would retain it and not claim any
more. and proof that partial distributions were made by him, as admin-
istrator of the intestate, in which he iade no claim to share, do not es-
tablish an election by iiiii to retain the advancements and waive his
claim to share in the di-tribution : -rd.
Whether the statutory mode of making such election -precludes all
others, not decided ; but i" such elections can arise by matters en pais,
it must be by clear, unequivocal acts, with a full knowledge of all the
circuinst:,ncei and the pa rty's right. Mere intention to elect, casual
declarations or loose conversations, will not suffice; especially, when not
acted on to the prejudice of another : Id.
EMINENT DO-MAIN.
Ad)pobiment of CJommissioners to estimate Damages for land taken
for Railroad..-On an application for the appointment of commission-
ers to estimate the damage on a condemnation of land for the use of a
railroad, the only inquiry that as a general rule will be made is, whether
the applicant has a prim d'fitie right: Delaware, Lackawanna & IV"st-
e" Railroal Co. v. Itedson Tund Railroad Co., 9 Vroom.
In this summary proceeding contestable questions will not be consi-
dered: .i.
EQUITY. See Election; Partnershi i.
.Eidence-Error.-The chancellor in ascertaining the existence of
facts from conflicting evidence is not necessarily to be governed by the
preponderance of the testimony. The material inquiry for him, is
whether the evidence generates in his mind a clear and rational belief
of the existence of the fa;ct affirmed, essential to relief' sougrt, or de-
fence interposed : Marlowe and 117(fe v. Benaghg, S. C. Ala.
The Appellate Court will not reverse the finding of' the chancellor
upon facts merely because it cannot see that his decree is right-it
must be fully convinced that it is wrong. The presumption in favor
of the judgnent of the court below, prevails as well to its finding upon
facts as to its rulings upon the law : Id.
.lelief against Fomfeitnre cased by Accident-Cnonot take away
Legal Rights.-Tbis was a bill to redeem a mortgage which had been
foreclosed by advertisement. The sale was made Septeniber 21st 1871,
in parcels, all of which were bid off by Adams, the mortgagee, for the
aggregate aiount of $315.12. Complainants claim the property to
be worth $3000. The sale appears to have been regular. Adams re-
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sided in Pennsylvania. and the mortgaged premises are in Newaygo
county. Before the foreclosure was begun the mortgage was in the
hands of one ltiblet, Adams's agent, who had received and remitted
several payments. In June 1871, the mortgage was put into the hands
of Fuller, an attorney at Newaygo, for foreclosure. After the sale, an
on December 14th 1871, complainant paid Iliblet $100, for which the
latter gave his receipt as payment on the mortgage. Before the year
ran out complainant became dangerously ill and unable to attend to any
business and was delirious much of the time, and by reason of this mis-
fortune was, as he claims, prevented from redeeming. In October
1872, Riblet offered to return the money paid to him, which complain-
ant refused. Complainant afterwards tried to come to some arrange-
ment for getting back the land, but failed. The grounds rolied on to
support complainant's right of redemption are : First' the waiver of
defendant's statutory rights by the receipt of the payment of the $100;
second, the accident and misfortune which prevented redemption within
the year by an unavoidable mental and physical disorder; and third, in-
adequacy of price. Held, 1. That the evidence shows that the payment
of the $100 was made, not as a separate payment to redeem particular
parcels, nor with the idea that the statutory foreclosure was to be waived,
but with the clear understanding that he was to complete the redemp-
tion by paying the whole sum necessary for that purpose within the
year allowed by the statute, and was therefore in affirmance rather than
in avoidance of the sale. 2. That while courts of equity have large
powers for relief against the consequences of inevitable accident in pri-
vate dealings, and may doubtless control their own process and decrees to
that end, they have no such power to relieve against statutory forfeit-
ures in the absence of fraud. 3. That the inadequacy of price cannot
vitiate such a sale if otherwise fair and regular : Cameron et al. v.




HIGHWAY. See Husband and Wife.
Duty of Town to adjoining Landowner.-The owner of land ad-
joining a highway may maintain an action at common law against the
town to recover damage caused to his land by the fiault or negligence
of the town in not building and maintaining the road in a reasonably
suitable and proper manner: Gilman v. Laconia, 55 N. H.
Interest of Town in.-Towns have a qualified interest in the high-
ways within their limits, which they have constructed and are bound to
keep in repair, and may maintain case for their obstruction : Laconia
v. Gilman, 55 N. H.
HOLIDAY.
Judgment of Court on Holidcry-Sundaoy.-Defondant in error sued
Hemmens to recover under the statute (Comp. L., chap. 69) for moneys
paid to the latter by the husband of the former in the purchase of intoxi-
cating drinks. The principal question is whether 4 previous suit be-
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tween the same parties was not a bar to this. The court below held it
no bar. It seenis to have been made out that the previous suit was for
the same cause of actiol'i. It was brought, before a justice, and was tried
without, a jury, February 21st 1874. The justice states in his docket
that after hearing the proofs " thereupon the court took till the 23d day
ofFebruary 1874. at 10 o'clock A. xr., to render his decision at his office
in Clinton. February 23d 1874, 10 o'clock A. -m., cause called and par-
ties appeared. and I, the said justice, do decide and determine that the
abovc-naiied plaintiff has no cause of action against said defend:nt, and
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the said defendant and against
the said plaintiff for the sum of forty-seven cents and costs of' suit."
This judgment the plaintiff treated as void, and proceeded to institute
the present suit. The statute (Compiled Laws, section 1559) requiring
the 22,1 of' February, among other days, to be treated for all purpose of
holding courts. &c., as Sunday, provides that in case any of said holidays
shall fll upon a Sunday, then the Monday following shall be considered
as the said holiday. In 1674 the 22d of February fell upon Sunday.
Hell. that the test of' what acts are included in the statute is whether
the same acts, if ierformed on Sunday, could be sustained ; that. the act
of rendering a judgment, if' performed on Sunday, would be void ; that
rendering judgment is clearly a judicial act, and it is necessary to hold
a court in order to pertbrm it; and that, being void, no one was under
obligation to regard it Ifemmens v. Bently, S. C. Mich.
HOMESTEAD.
Cii, Lot-f-reet or Alley not included in 2easureent.-The Home-
stead Exemption Act of this state must receive a liberal construction
Weisbrod v. Daenicke, 36 Wis.
Said act exempts foiom sale on execution one-fourth of an acre of land
within a " recorded town-plat, or city, or village," and the dwelling
house thereon, " owned and occupied" by the debtor as a homestead.
Ield, that the word "occu l f ied" is to have a controlling effect in the
application of the statute : fi.
While, by the law of this state, the owner of a lot bounded by a
street, in a recorded town-plat, city or village, takes the fee to the
centre of the street, he has no right to occup9y any portion of such
street as his homestead, such occupation and use being inconsistent with
the public easement. Land included in a public street (or alley) is
therefore not to be reckoned in determining the debtor's homestead ex-
emption : Id.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Suit byl Ifusband for injurty to ife-Higltwayj.-Sect. 120, ch. 19,
R. S., provides that ' if any damage shall happen to any person, his
team, carriage or other property, by reason of the inefficiency or want
of repairs of any * * road in any town in this state, the person sustain-
ing such dmages shall have a right to sue for and recover the same
against such town." Iel, that a married man may recover under this
statute for loss of the services of his wife and expenses of her sickness,
resulting from an accident caused by a defective highway : Hunt v. The
lbwu of linfiedl, 36 Wis.
VOL. XXIII.-89
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INFANT.
Affirmance of Contract-6Chattel lAortgige..The court below put
this case to the jury under instructions in substance that an infint who
borrows money for a business enterprise and gives chattel mortgages
to secure the payment thereof with interest, cannot disaffirm this con-
tract without restoring the consideration received therefor, which in
this case would be the money borrowed. The circuit judge appears to
have regarded the mortgage as an executed contract, which was only to
be disaffirmed on placing the parties in statu guo. fleld, that this
view was erroneous ; that the mortgage, so far as the right to enforce it
by taking possession and making sale was concerned,;was only an exe-
cutory contract to perform by the payment of the suti borrowed ; that
whether it was actually void or only voidable is immaterial in this case,
as this suit was brought before the infant reached her majority and no
question of affirmance can be made ; that the result of the ruling in this
case was to enforce the contract which cont'essedly was at least voidable
against this inflint, though she had neither affirmed it nor as yet reached
the age when affirniance by her was practicable ; that the ground on
wjiich one who, by reason of a voidable contract made in his infancy,
has obtained possession of property which he retains on coming of age,
is required to return the property in order to disaffirm the contract,
is, that the retention of the property and dealing with it as his own
after he reaches the age of discretion operates as an affirmance of the
contract and precludes him from relying on an infant's privilege
Corey v. Burton et al., S. 0. Mich.
INSURANCE.
Condition against other Insurance.-The plaintiff obtained a policy
of insurance from The Niagara Insurance Co. on his house, barn and
other property, which contained a condition that "if the assured shall
have existing, during the existence of this policy, any other contract for
insurance (whether valid o" not) on the same property, unless consented
to, &c., then this insurance shall be void." Afterwards, without sur-
rendering or cancelling this policy, he obtained a policy from the de-
fendants on part of the same property, which contained the usual
condition against double insurance. Up to the time the property was
destroyed by fire the plaintiff was not aware of the condition in either
policy, and acted in good faith throughout. Held, that the insurance
in the Niagara company was subsisting, within the fair meaning of the
condition in the defendants' policy, at the time that policy was obtained,
so that the plaintiff cannot recover in this action for property covered
by the Niagara policy : Gee v. Cheshire County Mat. Fire Ins. Co., 55
N.H.
Quere, whether the condition in the Niagara policy, so far as it
speaks of an invalid contract of insurance, is not void for repugnancy to
the contract of indemnity of which the policy is evidence : i.
JUDG3MENT. See Roliday.
Power of Court over-Mfortgage-Setting aside Judicial Sale.-
Except in cases of judgments taken against parties through their mis-
take. inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect (R. S., ch. 125, sect.
38), the court has no power, at a subsequ ent term, to set aside a valid
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judgment for error in law or in fact committed by the court in render-
lg it or bcfore it was pronounced : 14 Wis. 28; 15 Id. 475; 20 Id.
265: Qui,tw v. Lameraux and others, 36 Wis.
In foreclosure of a lorfgge, the Circuit Court for the proper county
acquired jurisdiction by personal service of the summons upon one of
the heirs of the mortgagor ; and it rendered judgmeut of foreclosure and
sale, and the land was sold, and report of the sale made by the sheriff.
At a subsequent term, none of the grounds of relief mentioned in the
statute (sect. 38, ch. 125, I.. S.) being shown, delcindant moved to set
aside the judgment and the sale and report. Held, that the court pro-
perly refused to vacate thejudment, although there were errors therein
which would have been fatal on appeal : Id.
The imortgagre was of an undivided half of a certain tract of land; and
after it was given, the mortgagor and his co-tenants made partition of
the land, the mortgagor taking the south hal" thereof. At the mort-
gage sale, the sheriff was offered for an undivided half of said south
half of the tract, the whole amount of the debt, &c., for which sale was
directed to be made, but refused such bid, and sold the whole mortgage
premises. The party by whom such bid was Knade states (in his affida-
vit in support of the motion to vacate) that if a re-sale is ordered, he
will bid and pay for said undivided half of the south half of the tract,
the whole amount required to satisfy the judgment. IHeld, that the
court erred in reftsinr to set aside the sale and report thereof: Id.
The fict that the purchaser at the mortgage sale has conveyed a part
of his interest to another party should not prevent the court from vacat-
ing the sale; such conveyance having been made pending the motion to
vacate: 1d.
LiEN.
For haulhig Lumber.-A. contracted with ]3. to haul for him a quan-
tity of lumber at a stipulated price per thousand feet. Held, that he
had a lien on the whole quantity drawn, within sixty days next prior to
the date ot his writ brought to enforce his lien for the price of tie haul-
ing within that time, and not a separate lien on each thousand feet
for the price of drawing the same : Bean, v. Brown, 54 N. I
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF. See Bills and Notes.
Title to Personal Property.-In order that the title to a personal
eh:,ttel pass by operation of the Statute of Limitations, there must at
least be sonic use or appropriation of it, or some act of dominion over it,
inconsistent with an absolute right of property in the owner, and such
as would lay the foundation of an action for its recovery: Baker v.
Chase, 55 N. II.
In 1861 the plaintiff bought a piece of land on which were lying
some split stones, the property of the defendant. For more than six
years the stones were not moved by either party, and no claim of
ownership in them was asserted by either to the other. Held, that the
title to the stones did not pass to the plaintiff by virtue of the statute:
Id.
MARRIED WO.MAN. See Bills and Notes.
MORTGAGE. See Ifant ; Judlgment.
Of Chattels-Pledge.-A. gave his note to B., and as collateral secur-
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ity for its payment, transferred and set over to B., by a written instru-
ment of the same date, two notes of one M. and a chattel mortgage
securing them, with condition that if defiult were made in the paynment
of the A, note, B. should have authority to collect the M. notes, or to
negotiate them, for the purpose of liquidating said note of A. field,
that this was a mortgage, and not aldedge, of the I. notes. and vested
the title o them, conditionally, in 1B. : _F'aker v. Reeve and another, 36
Wis.
A. having made default in the payment of his note, B., upon due
notice to A., sold the M. notes at public auction, field, that he was
not liable to A. as for a conversion of said notes : 1d..
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
New Street-Liability for Damage by Drainage.-A city is not liable
for damage done by surfice-water running down in' large quantities
through a new street constructed over the crest or a hill, and there con-
nected with traverse streets : Town of Union v. Drkes, 9 Vrooin.
Contra, if the opening of such new street draws off the water from
q natural watercourse: Id.
NEGLIGENCE
Contributory-Risks of Employment.-The plaintiff was employed
as an engineer in running one of the passenger trains of the defendants
in error, and on the evening of November 23d 1871. and when a switch
near the Grand Trunk junction was misplaced, ran his train off upon
a side track and against cars which were standing there, and received
an injury for which he brought suit against the company. Under the
ruling of the court below the jury returned a verdict for defendants.
The evidence conclusively showed that in managing and running the
train at the time, he disregarded the instructions which the company
had issued for his guidance, and was therein guilty of gross negligence,
which directly conduced to the injury complained of. Keld, 1. That
upon such facts the plaintiff was not entitled to recover, and the ruling
of the court below was correct. 2. That there is also much room for saying
that this accident was within the risks the plaintiff assumed by entering
into the employment: Lyon v. Detroit, Lansing & Lake Atichigan Rail-
road Co., S. C. Mich.
NUISANCE.
Action by Individual for Public-Pollation of Waters qf Stream-
Riparian Owne-Special Damages.-An action by an individual will
not lie for o common nuisance, unless special damages to the plaintiff be
alleged and shown ; but he may recover actual damages peculiar to him-
self : Green v. Annemacher and others, .36 Wis.
A proprietor of the land has a right to enjoy the use of the waters of
a river which flows upon his land, for his cattle and for domestic pur-
poses, without having their purity destroyed by the discharge of slops,
manure and other offensive and deleterious substances, from a distillery,
cattle stables or hog yard maintained by an upper proprietor on the same
stream; and a violation of this riparian right may be such ground of
special damage as will entitle him to maintain a private action as for a
nuisance against such upper proprietor : Id.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
The description of plaintiff's premises by metes and bounds, given in
the complaint, shows that the whole western boundary thereof is the
right bank" of a river flowing in a northerly direction at that place
ICil, that such a boundary would not give him the rights of a riparian
proprietor : Id.
But the complaint further alleges that said river flows "partly around
and partly through" plaintiff's said land. Held, that this averment, taken
as tru6, shows that plaintiff is a riparian proprietor on such river : Id.
The complaint further avers, in substance, that by reason of the un-
wholesome condition of the atmosphere around plaintiff's premises,
caused by the nuisance complained of, plaintiff has been and is deprived
of a great many customers and much patronage in his business as a tavern
or saloon-keeper ; that his profits have thus been diminished at least five
thousand dollars a year; and that he and his family have been greatly
injured in health, and subjected to frequent illness from the same cause.
Ild. on demurrer, that these averments show special and peculiar in-
jury for which plaintiff may maintain an action: Id.
PARTNERSHIP. See Bills and Notes.
Real Estate bought with Partnership Fands.-Real estate purchased
with partnership funds for partnership business, is treated in equity as
partnership property, without regard to the manner in which it was
bought, or to the person to whom the legal title was conveyed : Little.
v. Snedicor, S. C. Ala.
The heirs of one deceased partner, where the title was in him, will be
treated as trustees for the surviving partner. It is immaterial that the
trust should be expressed ; if it exists and is clearly proved, it will be
enforced as other resulting trusts : Id.
A bill filed for account and settlement of partnership affairs, praying
that land, alleged to have been purchased by one of the partners. &c., be
decreed partnership assets, &c., should set forth, by appropriate allega-
tions, the contract or agreement of partnership, and the agreement and
facts concerning the purchase of the land so as to enable the court to
judge whether a co-partnership was in reality formed, and to see with-
out doubt that the land purchased was to be partnership property: 1d.
Where it is alleged that the partnership was formed at a given time,
in a certain year, when each of the partners contributed, as capital stock
of the firm, the amounts respectively shown by an exhibit which does
not show any such contributions at the time stated, but consists merely
of a statement in figures of various sums of money as having been con-
tributed by the parties respectively for a series of years, beginning after
the year in which it is alleged the partnership was formed, there is re-
pugnancy between the allegations and exhibit: Id.
PLEADING. See Corporation.
Immaterial Avermets.-It is only where the pleader attempts to
declare upon the contract. in haec verba, that a technical variance in an
immaterial matter becomes. of consequence; such particularity is not
requisite when the contract is declared on according to its legal effect:
Preston v. Dunham, S. C. Ala.
A note payable ", by" the 1st day of November 1870, to "John L.
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Dunham, agent or bearer," may be properly declared on as payable to
John L. Dunham "on" the 1st day of November 1870 : Id.
RAILROAD. See Negligence.
RIPARIAN OWNER. See Nhuisance.
ROAD DA-MAGES.
What are included in Assessment.-An assessment for damages fo:
land taken to widen a road, includes all damages occasioned by reducing
the land so taken to the grade of such road, and consequently where
the grade of such road was subsequently changed, the damages occa-
sioned by such change were held not to include any but such as arose
by the alteration of the road in its entire width from the old established
grade to the new grade: Van Riper v. Essex Public Board, 9 Vrooin.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
Family Arrangement- Want of Precision in Contract.-This was
a bill for the specific performance of an alleged agreement to convey
lands. Defendant is father of complainant, and the agreement set up is
that the defendant, in consideration of the work already performed by
complainant, and the money already paid by complainant to defendant,
and of love and affection, undertook and agreed that if complainant would
go on to said land and improve it, he, the 'defendant, would give com-
plainant a good warranty deed of the same. The bill does not disclose
the fact shown by the proofs, that there never was any written agree-
ment. Held, 1. That the contract set out by the bill is very vague as
to the kind and extent of the improvements to be made and the time
within which they were to be made, and it furnishes no criterion by
which- to determine when the work had been performed, and that spe-
cific performance cannot be granted until tle contract is made clear and
definite. 2. That the proot fail to establish any contract or to show
possession taken with a view of carrying out any supposed contract;
that they indicate nothing more than a vague intention of giving the
land at some time or other. 3. That this case is an effort to make an
agreement out of one of those family arrangements which are under-
stood to rest on the will of the parties, where each sees fit to rely on an
expectation and does not require a binding contract ; and that whatever
may be the hardships of being disappointed in such expectations, par-
ties cannot ask courts to frame contracts in their behalf which they have
neglected to make for themselves : Wright v. Wright, S. 0. Mich.
STATUTE.
Repeal by new Act revising the same S'ubject.-A statute which re-
vises the whole subject-matter of a former statute, works a repeal thereof,
without any express words of repeal: Oleson v. G. B. & Lake Pep in
Railwa Co., 36 Wis.
Ch. 182, Laws of 1872 (relating to the grant of railroad aid by
towns, &c.), provides (section 11) that if any county, town, city or vil-
lage shall issue and deliver to any railroad company any bonds in pur-
suance of the provisions of this act, it shall not thereafter issue or
deliver any bonds or incur any liability in aid of the construction of
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the railroad of such company, by virtue of the authority of any other
lao of this state. Reld, that the words " other law of this state" must
be understood of other laws existing at the time of the passage of said
cl. 282, as it was not within the power of one legislature to bind future
legislatures by such a provision, and tile subsequent passage of an act
in conflict with it would operate as a repeal of said chapter pro tanto
1t.
Construction of Sitpp cment.-An act and its supplement are to be
construed as one law, so that the terms of the act may, in their construe-
tion with the supplement, have a broader meaning thdn they originally
possessed: Van Riper v. Essex Public Road, 9 Vroom.
STREA.T. See Nuisance.
Right of -"aowae-Uscr.-The same proof of user, which establishes
the right to use the water of a stream in a particular way, is equally
conclusive in establishing the limitations of that right, The doctrine
of Burnham v. Kenipton, 44 N. H. 78, affirmed: Griffin v. Bartlett, 55
N. 1H.
B. having gained by prescription a right to flow G.'s meadow, from
October to June of each year, to the height of his ancient dam, repaired
and tightened the dam, erected an additional mill, put in new and im-
proved machinery consuming less water, and claimed the right to operate
the mills as thus constructed, provided he (lid not raise the water above
the top of his ancient dam. Held, that he could not flow G.'s land in a
different manner nor to a greater extent than he had formerly done: Id.
G-. having brought an action against B. for flowing his meadow, showed
no title to the land flowed, except a deed dated in 1831. and no posses-
sion prior to that time. B. showed that G.'s meadow had been flowed
prior to 1831 by a dam over which he (B.) had exercised control since
1868, and claimed that his right to flow B.'s meadow would be pre-
suuied, and that the burden of proof was on G. to show that lie had ac-
quired a right to hold his land free of water. 17eld, that the burden of
proof was on B. to show that he had a right to flow as claimed by him
Id.
STREET. See Municipal Corporaton.
'TowN. See Highway.
UsuRY.
Intent-Evidence of.-An intent on the part of the lender to stipulate
for an unlawful rate of interest is essential, to render usurious a contract
to pay more than a legal rate: Grant v. Merrill, 36 Wis.
But where it is shown that the lender knowingly accepted and retains
such, a contract, the intent is conclusively established : _rl.
For a loan of $900 the lender's agent took defendant's note for $1000
with interest at ten per cent. (the highest legal rate), and gave such note
to his principal, who then knew the amount thereof and of the loan, and
the lender transferred such note to a third person, taking therefor his
note for the same amount. Held, in an action on the first-mentioned
note, that it was error to submit to the jury the question of the lender's
intent: Id.
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if one of tle defendants, who was an accommodation maker, received
from the other defendant a portion of the loan to indemnify h uh fir
signing the note, the amount so paid cannot be recovered from him in
action directly on the note, by the owner thereof. Whether such plain-
tiff can rdcover the amount from said defendant in another action, is not
here determined : Id.
There was some evidence that one of the defendants, for a valuable
consideration, promised one D. to pay said note ; but it does not appear
that D. had any interest in its payment. Held, that such promise would
not enure to plaintiff's benefit: Id.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER.
Option to cancel Contract-Loss of by Aets.-By the terms of a con-
tract for the sale and purchase of land, the vendee was empowered to
terminate the contract at any time before tile second instalnent became
due, forfeiting the sum already paid. Subsequently he assigned his in-
terest in said contract and in the land to a third party, who took and re-
tains possession of the land under the contract. Held, that the vendee.
by putting it out of his power to surrender or cancel the written instru-
ment, or to restore to the vendor the possession of the land, abandoned
the right to terminate the contract, and remains liable in an action
thereon by the vendor: Stevens v. Millard, 36 Wis.
WATERS AND WATERCOURSES. See Canal Company; Municipal Cor-
poration ; Stream.
Riparian Riglts.-Where a stream is a navigable highway for part
of the year only for the purpose of running logs, it is to be considered
as navigable and subject to the public easement only at such times in
the year as when in its natural condition it is capable of being made use
of for that purpose, and not when its whole capability 1br such use
is created by artificial means and by abridging what but for the resort
to these artificial means would be the unquestionable rights of riparian
proprietors below ; such a stream is a public highway by nature, but one
which is such only periodically and while the natural condition permits
of a natural use ; during that time the public right of floatage and the
private right of the riparian proprietor must each be exercised with due
consideration for the other, and any injury which the latter receives
from a proper use of the stream for floatage lie must submit to as inci-
dent to his situation upon navigable waters; but at the periods when
there is no highway at all there is no ground for asserting a right to
create one by means which appropriate or destroy private rights. and
an owner who dams up the water so as to interrupt the flow, and then
lets the stream out at periods, to float his logs, is-liable to an action for
damages to a lower riparian owner; Thunder Bay River Boom Co. v.
SPeechley, S. C. Mich.
WITNESS.
Presumption as to Testimony of.When nothing appears to the con-
trary, it will be presumed that what a witness states is within his know-
ledge, and that his knowledge was derived from proper sources: Pear.
son v. Wheeler, 55 N. H.
